In a key predistribution scheme a trusted authority distributes pieces of information among a set of users in such a way that users belonging to a speciÿed privileged subset can compute individually a secret key common to this subset. In such a scheme, a family of forbidden subsets of users cannot obtain any information about the value of the secret. In this paper, we present a new construction of a key predistribution scheme using a family of vector space secret sharing schemes. The set of privileged users and the family of forbidden subsets is described in terms of the family of vector space access structures. A generalization using linear secret sharing schemes is given. We show that a particular case of this construction is any key predistribution scheme in which pieces of information and secrets are linear combinations of random numbers. Using this result, we show explicitly that the most important key predistribution schemes can be seen as a particular case of this construction. For this construction, the question of when given secrets can be predistributed is discussed. ?
Introduction
One major problem in communication and network security is key distribution. Most networks can be thought of as broadcast networks, in which anyone connected to the network will have access to all the information that ows through it. In many situations, such as a pay-per-view television broadcast, the data should be available to some privileged users. In this case, encryption is frequently used in order to protect the conÿdentiality of information. If AES [12] or any other private-key cryptosystem is employed to ensure conÿdentiality, then it is necessary to distribute keys to the users in a secure fashion.
In a key predistribution scheme a trusted authority generates and distributes secret pieces of information that allow some privileged users to recover a private key. Users belonging to a speciÿed privileged subset can compute individually a secret key common to this subset. A family of forbidden subsets of users must have no information about the value of the secret. We will consider key predistribution schemes which are unconditionally secure; i.e., where security does not depend on any computational assumption. Key predistribution schemes are used in broadcast encryption. A broadcast encryption is a key predistribution followed by a broadcast message which is to be decrypted by a speciÿed privileged subset of users. The decrypted message may be a session key for use in a private-key cryptosystem by the privileged users.
Various key predistribution schemes have so far been proposed. Blom's scheme [2] implements a key predistribution scheme in which any 2-subset of users has an associated secret key and forbidden subsets are subsets with at most a ÿxed number of users disjoint with the privileged subset. Blundo's et al. scheme [4] is a generalization of Blom's scheme in which any t-subset is a privileged subset. Fiat-Naor's scheme [7] implements a key predistribution scheme for any subset of users as privileged subsets and the family of forbidden subsets of the Blom's scheme.
In this paper, we present a new construction of a key predistribution scheme using a family of vector space secret sharing schemes. An introduction to secret sharing schemes and key predistribution schemes can be found in Section 2. In Section 3 of this paper, we present the new construction of key predistribution schemes. We determine the collection of privileged subsets of users and its forbidden subsets by means of the secret sharing schemes used. The family of privileged subsets is described in terms of the family of the access structures of the vector space secret sharing schemes used to construct the key predistribution scheme. The collection of forbidden subsets is expressed in terms of the dual of the family of vector space access structures. We determine the information rate and the total information rate of the proposed scheme. We show a particular case of this construction that gives us a key predistribution scheme for any collection of privileged subsets together with its family of forbidden subsets. In Section 4 we present some extensions of this construction by means of linear secret sharing schemes instead of vector space secret sharing schemes. We show that a particular case of this construction is any key predistribution scheme in which pieces of information and secrets are linear combinations of random numbers. Using the above results with this extension of the construction, we ÿnd a method to compute the subsets of privileged users and families of forbidden subsets. This method is valid for any key predistribution scheme in which secrets and pieces of secrets are linear combinations of random numbers. We show, explicitly, that the most important key predistribution schemes can be seen as a particular case of this construction. We discuss when given secrets can be predistributed. At the end of the paper, we present the fact that all the results of the paper hold when is used a multisecret sharing scheme instead of vector space secret sharing schemes or linear secret sharing schemes. We end with some conclusions in Section 5.
Deÿnitions and some previews
First we present an introduction to secret sharing schemes and practical implementations. This tool will be used on the presented constructions of key predistribution schemes. A secret sharing scheme is a method for dividing a secret into pieces called shares. Shares are distributed among a set P of participants in such a way that only authorized subsets of P can reconstruct the secret from their shares. We will consider perfect secret sharing schemes, that is, secret sharing schemes in which subsets that are not authorized to reconstruct the secret have absolutely no information on it. Secret sharing schemes are unconditionally secure; that is, security does not depend on the computational resources of an adversary. Sometimes it is useful to consider a special participant D ∈ P called dealer. See [14, 15] for a comprehensive introduction to secret sharing schemes.
The access structure, ⊂ 2 P , of a secret sharing scheme is the family of authorized subsets. Access structures are considered to be monotone increasing, i.e., any superset of an authorized subset must be authorized. Then, the access structure is determined by the family of minimal authorized subsets, 0 , which is called the basis of , because = {A ⊂ P: there exists B ∈ 0 such that B ⊂ A}. We will say that is the closure of 0 and we will write = cl( 0 ).
For example, the (t; n)-threshold access structure consists of all the subsets with at least t of n participants, where t; n ¿ 0. Secret sharing schemes for threshold access structures were the ÿrst secret sharing schemes proposed and have been independently introduced by Blakley [1] and Shamir [13] in 1979. In this latter work, Shamir introduced a secret sharing scheme for a threshold access structure based on polynomial interpolation.
For the special case of an (n; n)-threshold access structure, Karnin et al. deÿne in [10] a secret sharing scheme in the following way: for a secret k in a ÿnite ÿeld GF(q), with q a power of a prime, the dealer takes at random s pi ∈ GF(q) for any i = 1; : : : ; n − 1 and P = {p 1 ; : : : ; p n }. The share of participant p i ∈ P is s pi for any i = 1; : : : ; n − 1 and s pn = k − (s p1 + · · · + s pn−1 ). In this secret sharing scheme, the secret can only be reconstructed with all the shares, using k = n i=1 s pi . The vector space construction is a useful method for constructing schemes for certain access structures, and was introduced by Brickell [5] .
is said to be a vector space access structure if, for some vector space GF(q) t over a ÿnite ÿeld GF(q), there exists a function : P ∪ {D} → GF(q) t such that A ∈ if and only if the vector (D) can be expressed as a linear combination of the vectors in the set (A) = { (p): p ∈ A}. If is a vector space access structure, we can construct a secret sharing scheme for with set of secrets GF(q) (see [5] for proofs). For a secret value k ∈ GF(q), the dealer takes at random an element
The share of a participant p ∈ P is s p = v (p). A scheme constructed in this way is called a vector space secret sharing scheme. Shamir's scheme [13] can be seen as a vector space secret sharing scheme [14] . The Karnin et al., secret sharing scheme [10] can be seen as a vector space secret sharing scheme using t = n, (p i ) = e i with e 1 ; : : : ; e n the canonical basis of GF(q) n and (D) = e 1 + · · · + e n . The linear secret sharing scheme is a generalization of the vector space secret sharing scheme construction that provides a secret sharing scheme for any access structure [8] . This construction is a modiÿcation of the vector space secret sharing scheme in which every participant can have more than one vector.
A monotone decreasing family of subsets F ⊂ P is a family in which any subset of an element of the family must be an element of the family. The family of non-authorized subsets is an example of a monotone decreasing family of subsets. In general a monotone decreasing family of subsets is determined by the family F 0 of maximal subsets, because F = {A ⊂ P: there exists B ∈ F 0 such that A ⊂ B}. We will say that F is the coclosure of F 0 and we will write F = cocl(F 0 ).
Using the family of non-authorized subsets, Jackson and Martin deÿne in [8] the dual access structure of as * = {P − A: A ∈ }. Some nice properties and applications of the dual structure were presented in [8] .
In a key predistribution scheme a trusted authority generates and distributes secret pieces of information to users on U = {1; 2; : : : ; n} in such a way that users called privileged can individually compute a secret key k i with i = 1; : : : ; '. Every secret k i determines a subset of privileged users P i ⊂ U. We will denote by F i ⊂ 2 U the collection of forbidden subsets to key k i , i.e., the collection of all possible coalitions of users against which the secret key k i is to remain secure. The main di erence between secret sharing schemes and key predistribution schemes is that in the ÿrst schemes there is only one secret and the recovering is performed by a subset of participants and in the second schemes there are more than one secret and the recovering is performed individually. As in secret sharing scenario the security in a key predistribution scheme is unconditional. Of course F i must be a monotone decreasing access structure verifying that for any F ∈ F i , F ∩ P i = ∅. We will call a key predistribution scheme unconditionally secure for privileged subsets P i and forbidden subsets F i , i = 1; : : : ; ', simply a (P i ; F i ) i -key predistribution scheme.
The ÿrst author to consider key predistribution schemes was Blom in [2] . In this paper the Blom's scheme [2] was presented, which implements a (P; F P ) P -key predistribution scheme with P any 2-subset of U and F P ={F ⊂ U: P ∩F =∅ and |F| 6 !}, for ! ¿ 1. For this scheme the trusted authority constructs a random polynomial
s ij x i y j with s ij = s ji ∈ GF(q). For every user i ∈ U the trusted authority chooses at random a i ∈ GF(q). These n numbers are distinct and public. The trusted authority gives to user i coe cients of polynomial g i (x) = f(x; a i ) as his/her secret pieces of information. The key associated with the pair of user P ij = {i; j} is k ij = g i (a j ) = g j (a i ).
Some other constructions have also been given. The trivial scheme implements a (P; F P ) P -key predistribution scheme with P any t-subset of U, with t ¿ 1, and F P = {F ⊂ U: P ∩ F = ∅}. In this scheme the trusted authority chooses a random value k P ∈ GF(q) and gives k P to every user of P.
In the Matsumoto-Imai's scheme [11] the trusted authority chooses at random (m; m) symmetric matrices A 1 ; : : : ; A h over GF(q) and assigns identity vectors I i ∈ GF(q) m to every user i ∈ U. The matrices are private and the identity vectors are public and distinct for every user. The trusted authority gives to user i vectors A 1 I ). This key predistribution scheme implements a (P; F P ) P -key predistribution scheme with P any 2-subset of U and F P depending on the collection of identity vectors chosen by the trusted authority.
The Blundo et al. scheme [4] implements a (P; F P ) P -key predistribution scheme with P any t-subset of U and F P = {F ⊂ U: P ∩ F = ∅ and |F| 6 !}, with t ¿ 2; ! ¿ 1. The trusted authority uses a symmetric polynomial in t variables in a similar way to Blom's scheme.
The Fiat-Naor's scheme [7] implements a (P; F P ) P -key predistribution scheme for any P ⊂ U and F P = {F ⊂ U: P ∩ F = ∅ and |F| 6 !}, with ! ¿ 1. For every subset F ⊂ U of cardinality at most !, the trusted authority generates at random s F ∈ GF(q) and gives s F to every user in U − F. The key associated with a privileged set P is k P = F∈FP s F .
We are interested in the e ciency of a key predistribution scheme, as measured by the amount of secret information that is distributed to each user. Let U i denote the set of all possible secret pieces of information that might be distributed to user i ∈ U. Let U U ⊂ U 1 × · · · × U n denote the set of all possible combinations of secret pieces received by users in U. We will assume that each secret key k i is equally likely to be any element of GF(q). We will also assume that there is a probability distribution on U U , and that the trusted authority chooses u U ∈ U U according to this probability distribution. In terms of the entropy function (see [6] for more details on the entropy function), the information rate of a key predistribution scheme is deÿned to be = min i∈U log q H (U i ) :
In order to measure the total amount of information distributed to all the users, the total information rate of a key predistribution scheme is deÿned to be
For more information on key predistribution schemes see [3, 16] .
In the next section, we are going to present a generation of key predistribution schemes using secret sharing schemes. Table 1 x (x)
(1; 0; 1)
(1; 1; 1)
(1; 2; 3) k 3 = r 1 + 2r 2 + 3r 3 3. A key predistribution scheme using vector space secret sharing schemes
We deÿne a key predistribution scheme by means of a family of vector space secret sharing schemes. The idea of the key predistribution scheme is the following. Let us consider a family of vector space secret sharing schemes with the same shares for di erent secrets. This can be obtained by considering several dealers with di erent linear combinations. Suppose that every participant is a subset of users. The trusted authority distributes the set of secrets giving the common share of one participant (for all the schemes) to the users belonging to this participant. Informally, we can say that instead of distributing shares to users, the dealer distributes shares to (possibly intersecting) subsets, each share being given to all the users belonging to the corresponding subset.
Let U = {1; 2; : : : ; n} a set of n users and a family of subsets G ⊂ 2 U . Let : G ∪ {D 1 ; : : : ; D ' } → GF(q) t be a map with D 1 ; : : : ; D ' ∈ G. For any i = 1; : : : ; ' the map i = |G∪{Di} deÿnes a vector space access structure i = {A ⊂ G: i (D i ) ∈ i (A) } on the set of participants G.
The deÿnition of the key predistribution scheme is as follows. For a random vector v ∈ GF(q) t we distribute secrets k i = v i (D i ) for any i =1; : : : ; '. The share s G = v i (G) of participant G ∈ G is the same for all the schemes and it is distributed to users in G.
Let us present an example of this construction. Suppose that U = {1; 2; 3; 4; 5} and G={G 1 ; G 2 ; G 3 ; G 4 } with G 1 ={1; 3}; G 2 ={2; 4}; G 3 ={1; 2; 5}; G 4 ={1; 2; 4; 5}. Consider : 3 , with q ¿ 3, the map deÿned in Table 1 with the determined share s Gi and secret keys k i when the random vector (r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ) is used.
Then user 1 receives r 1 ; r 2 ; r 1 + r 3 , user 2 receives r 1 ; r 2 ; r 1 + r 3 , user 3 receives r 1 , user 4 receives r 1 ; r 1 + r 3 and user 5 receives r 2 ; r 1 + r 3 .
The following proposition give us the family of privileged subsets of users for every secret key: Proposition 1. The above construction is a key predistribution scheme in the set of users U with privileged subsets:
for every secret k i with i = 1; : : : ; '.
Proof. For a given i = 1; : : : ; ' we wish to know what users u ∈ U can individually recover the secret k i . Due to the construction of the scheme, {G ∈ G: u ∈ G} must be an authorized subset of i . Then, there exists A ∈ i such that u ∈ G for any G ∈ A, that is u ∈ G∈A G. So, u ∈ A∈ i ( G∈A G).
The family of forbidden subsets is the following:
Proposition 2. For the privileged subset P i of this key predistribution scheme, the family of forbidden subsets is
Proof. A subset of users F ⊂ U cannot obtain any information about the value of the secret k i if {G ∈ G: there exists u ∈ F such that u ∈ G} ∈ i . By deÿnition of the dual structure, {G ∈ G: for any u ∈ F; u ∈ U − G} ∈ * i , that is, {G ∈ G:
In these two propositions it su ces to use minimal subsets of i and * i , respectively. In the example above, we can compute the access structure 1 
4} and the family of forbidden subsets of users F 1 = cocl({U − G 1 ∪ G 2 ; U − G 4 }) = cocl({{5}; {3}}) = {{3}; {5}; ∅}. We also have 2 = cl({{G 3 ; G 4 }}), its dual * 2 = cl({{G 3 }; {G 4 }}), the determined subset of privileged users P 2 = G 3 ∩ G 4 = {1; 2; 5} and the family of forbidden subsets of users F 2 = cocl({U − G 3 ; U − G 4 }) = cocl({{3; 4}; {3}}) = {{3; 4}; {3}; {4}; ∅}. Finally
and the family of forbidden subsets of users
An easy computation give us the values of the information rate and the total information rate for this key predistribution scheme: Proposition 3. This key predistribution scheme has information rate = 1 max i∈U |{G ∈ G: i ∈ G}| and total information rate
For instance, if we use a graph with vertex set U and edge set G (that is |G| = 2 for any G ∈ G), we have = 1=d and T = 1=e where d is the maximum vertex degree and e is the number of edges of the graph.
Using this construction we can give a key predistribution scheme for a family (P i ; F i ) i=1; :::; ' with P i ⊂ U and F i ⊂ 2 U where F ∩ P i = ∅ for any F ∈ F i and i = 1; : : : ; '. In this key predistribution scheme every privileged subset contains P i and the family of forbidden subsets is F i . The way to deÿne this key predistribution scheme is the following: let us suppose that F= ' i=1 F i is F={F 1 ; : : : ; F t } and deÿne G = {G 1 ; : : : ; G t } with G i = U − F i for i = 1; : : : ; t. Let : G ∪ {D 1 ; : : : ; D ' } → GF(q) t be a map deÿned by (G i ) = e i with e 1 ; : : : ; e t the canonical basis of GF(q) t and (D i ) = Fj∈Fi e j . In this case the access structure deÿned in G is i = cl({G: U − G ∈ F i }). The dual access structure is * i = cl({{G}: U − G ∈ F i }). Propositions 1 and 2 give us the following result:
Corollary 4. For a given family of subsets (P i ; F i ) with P i ⊂ U for any i = 1; : : : ; ' and F i ⊂ 2 U with F ∩ P i = ∅ for any F ∈ F i , there is a key predistribution scheme in the set of users U where users in P i are privileged users and the family of forbidden subsets is F i .
This key predistribution scheme takes at random s 1 ; : : : ; s t ∈ GF(q) and gives every s i to users in U − F i . Secret k i is deÿned by k i = Fj∈Fi s j . In this case every vector space secret sharing scheme can be thought of as a Karnin et al. secret sharing scheme [10] for the set of participants {G:
The constructed key predistribution scheme is optimal with respect to both the keys held by each user and the keys generated by the trusted authority [3] .
If P i and F i verify that U = P i ∪ ( F∈Fi F), then in this construction the only privileged users are users in P i and forbidden subsets F i .
A particular case of this construction is the Fiat-Naor key predistribution scheme [7] , taken any P i ⊂ U, i=1; : : : ; ' with '=2 |U| and F i ={F ⊂ U: |F| 6 !; F ∩P i =∅} ⊂ 2 U , with ! ¿ 1.
Some extensions of the construction
Some extensions of this construction can be carried out. The ÿrst is to use a linear secret sharing scheme, that is, considering that every subset G ∈ G can have more than one vector. Section 3 results hold for this construction with few modiÿcations in Proposition 3.
The majority of key predistribution schemes deÿned so far have been deÿned in the following way. For a collection of random numbers (s 1 ; : : : ; s t ) pieces of information for every user are constructed as linear combinations of numbers (s 1 ; : : : ; s t ). The common secret key of a subset of privileged users is a linear combination of (s 1 ; : : : ; s t ). All the key predistribution schemes deÿned in Section 3 are of this kind.
Proposition 5. Let a key predistribution scheme be one in which pieces of information owned by users and secret keys of privileged subsets are linear combinations of random numbers. Then, this key predistribution scheme uses a family of linear secret sharing schemes, that is, it is one of those deÿned in Section 4.
It can be shown that Blom's scheme is a particular case of our construction using a linear secret sharing scheme in which ij = cl({{i}; {j}} ∪ {A ⊂ G: |A| = ! + 1}) with G = {{u}: u ∈ U}. A similar result can be found for Blundo et al. and Matsumoto-Imai key predistribution schemes.
For the most important key predistribution schemes, secret keys are generated using some algorithms, in such a way that the value is found at the end of the algorithm. For our construction, the question of when given secrets can be predistributed is discussed. Suppose that our key predistribution scheme is constructed using : G∪{D 1 ; : : : ; D ' } → GF(q) t . If we want to distribute secrets k 1 ; : : : ; k ' , we should take at random a vector v ∈ GF(q) t such that
. . .
Then, the predistribution of given secrets can only be possible when this linear system of equations has a solution. Finally, we can use a family of secret sharing schemes which, through an initial issuing of shares, permit a number of di erent secrets to be protected. This more general framework is called a multisecret sharing scheme (see [9] for more details). For such a kind of secret sharing scheme the results of Section 3 hold with few modiÿcations in Proposition 3.
Conclusions
A new construction of key predistribution schemes is considered in this paper. This construction is based on the use of a family of vector space secret sharing schemes. We determine the subset of privileged users for a secret key by means of the access structure of the used secret sharing scheme. We also ÿnd the family of forbidden subsets in terms of the dual of the vector space access structure. We obtain the information rate and the total information rate of the proposed scheme. As a particular case of this construction we show a key predistribution scheme for a given collection of privileged subsets together with its family of forbidden subsets. Besides, we present an extension of this construction by means of linear secret sharing schemes instead of vector space secret sharing schemes. We ÿnd that any key predistribution scheme in which pieces of information and secrets are linear combinations of random numbers is a particular case of this construction. Using the results above, we show a method to compute the subsets of privileged users and families of forbidden subsets. This method applies for any key predistribution scheme in which secrets and pieces of secrets are linear combinations of random numbers. We show, explicitly, that the most important key predistribution schemes can be seen as particular cases of this construction. We discuss when given secrets can be predistributed. The paper ends by showing that the fact that all the results hold when a multisecret sharing scheme is used instead of vector space secret sharing schemes or linear secret sharing schemes.
